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Abstract
Solutions to global sustainability challenges are increasingly technology-intensive. Yet, technologies are neither developed nor
applied to governance problems in a socio-political vacuum. Despite aspirations to provide novel solutions to current sustain-
ability governance challenges, many technology-centred projects, pilots and plans remain implicated in longer-standing global
governance trends shaping the possibilities for success in often under-recognized ways. This article identifies three overlap-
ping contexts within which technology-led efforts to address sustainability challenges are evolving, highlighting the growing
roles of: (1) private actors; (2) experimentalism; and (3) informality. The confluence of these interconnected trends illuminates
an important yet often under-recognized paradox: that the use of technology in multi-stakeholder initiatives tends to reduce
rather than expand the set of actors, enhancing instead of reducing challenges to participation and transparency, and reinforc-
ing rather than transforming existing forms of power relations. Without recognizing and attempting to address these limits,
technology-led multi-stakeholder initiatives will remain less effective in addressing the complexity and uncertainty surrounding
global sustainability governance. We provide pathways for interrogating the ways that novel technologies are being harnessed
to address long-standing global sustainability issues in manners that foreground key ethical, social and political considerations
and the contexts in which they are evolving.
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Insights
Digital technologies in sustainability governance:
possibilities, politics, power
Efforts to harness emerging technologies to address a host
of new and longer-standing sustainability challenges have
recently proliferated. Artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain,
big data and other new technologies are central to a grow-
ing number of on-going experiments, ranging from the
tracking of greenhouse emissions to monitoring wildlife
poaching and global supply chains, to transnational efforts
to combat human trafficking, and manage the COVID-19
pandemic. These unfolding experiments seek to mobilize
digital technologies to meet a growing range of governance
challenges that are typically grouped together under the
banner of sustainability and sustainable development.1
These developments have not, however, been much inter-
rogated in international relations and global governance
scholarship (though see Boersma and Nolan, 2019; Duberry,
2019; Gale, Ascui, and Lovell, 2017). Existing policy and practi-
tioner debates, meanwhile, tend to emphasize the affor-
dances and pathologies of specific digital technologies
(Beaumier et al., 2020). A number of important questions have
thus remained unaddressed: How do unfolding initiatives cen-
tred on AI, blockchains, big data and other emerging tech-
nologies seek to overcome, or extend and reinforce, the limits
of existing global governance? What debates and conflicts of
interest are elided by appeals to technological applications as
solutions to governance challenges? How does the develop-
ment and deployment of new technologies intersect with
existing disparities of power, resources, and access?
This article begins to address these questions, synthesiz-
ing discussions an interdisciplinary workshop on these
themes held at the University of Warwick in December
2019. We situate on-going technology-led experiments in
sustainability governance within three longer-standing glo-
bal trends: (1) a growing reliance on private, voluntary codes
of conduct, standards, and third-party auditing; (2) global
experimentalist governance; and (3) efforts to adapt gover-
nance mechanisms to deal with the growing prevalence of
informal and illicit economies. In light of this, we argue that
uses of technology in multi-stakeholder initiatives have
tended to reduce rather the scope for participation in sus-
tainability governance, deepen challenges to participation
and transparency, and reinforce rather than transform exist-
ing power relations.
In what follows, we outline the above three global gover-
nance trends in turn, tracing their intersections with emerg-
ing technology-centred initiatives in global sustainability
governance. We then conclude by outlining a number of
questions for scholars, practitioners and policy makers to
consider in interrogating the uses of technology in sustain-
ability governance.
Technology and private governance
Technology-centred initiatives to improve global sustainabil-
ity governance are in many ways extensions of the patch-
work of private codes of conducts and corporate social
responsibility (CSR) policies developed in recent decades.
The inability of these corporate-led modes of ‘responsible
governance’ to yield significant improvements for workers
and the planet is well-documented (Fransen and Burgoon,
2012; Koenig-Archibugi, 2017; LeBaron, Lister and Dau-
vergne, 2017). Such initiatives have frequently resulted in
mere ‘corporate philanthropy’ that favours powerful stake-
holders over grassroots communities (Orock, 2013). These
modes of governance have often reinforced existing
inequalities. For example, corporate codes of conduct for
worker safety in garment supply chains have been found to
pass costs of compliance on to supplier factories. Yet, they
do little to alleviate the time and cost pressures placed on
suppliers by major branded buyers, who often drive unsafe
working conditions in the first place (Scheper, 2017; Taylor,
2011).
Recent responses to these failures increasingly rely new
technologies. Big data and blockchain technologies, for
example, are increasingly instrumental to a growing range
of ‘multi-stakeholder’ arrangements between private for-
profit firms and public bodies seeking, for instance, to pro-
tect working conditions or to trace and disclose greenhouse
gas emissions and ‘conflict minerals’ across global supply
chains. These experiments are being developed and applied
in ways that reinforce existing patterns of governance and
relations of power.
Novel technologies are being integrated into the long-
standing practices of private professional service firms in
monitoring sustainability across global supply chains. Previ-
ous research shows how the ‘big four’ professional services
firms (KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, and EY) firms play a significant
and growing role in shaping private supply chain gover-
nance (Fransen and LeBaron, 2018). The Big Four, along with
smaller audit firms and consultancies (e.g. RCS Global)
increasingly promote blockchains as means of improving
the effectiveness of supply chain governance. Blockchain
delivers a record of the origin and journey of the raw mate-
rials, which is accessible to all relevant parties yet not
manipulable by any single ‘node’ in the shared digital net-
work. In so doing, blockchains can establish a community of
participants and an authoritative record of provenance, and
by moving confidential data freely between trading part-
ners, could enhance transparency and accountability. Yet,
these developments leave supply chain governance domi-
nated by lead firms, often working with the ‘big four’ and
more specialized supply chain management consultants. The
entities developing and supporting such technology-led pro-
jects are frequently the same ones involved in existing glo-
bal supply chain governance. The prominent roles of audit
firms and private sector consultants in developing techno-
logical solutions to global sustainability governance chal-
lenges raise important issues. The profit models of such
firms rest primarily on service fees. There is a danger that
private actors’ profit incentives could further fragment stan-
dards and enforcement across the proliferating range of
‘sustainability services’. Competition for clients threatens to
produce a ‘race to the bottom’ of the kind seen among
credit ratings agencies in the build-up to the global financial
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crisis (Kruck, 2011). Equally, such initiatives provide no new
standards or enforcement mechanisms and remain reliant
on existing forms of factory-, farm-, or mine-level monitor-
ing. In the words of a manager at one blockchain-based
audit start-up:
A blockchain will record an immutable record of
custody of a material, the locations it’s traveled
through, its composition over time, and all that . . .
But if you’re trying to make sure the wrong mate-
rial never enters the system in the first place, you
need processes to make this work.
(Hyperledger n.d., p. 3).
In brief, blockchain applications for supply chain gover-
nance leave market-based forms of governance rooted in
‘disclosure’ and soft standards largely intact, both in terms
of the actors involved and the standards being enforced.
We can see similar issues at stake if we move from supply
chain governance to new methods of ‘greening’ financial
markets, another key area where experiments with new
technologies are underway. Environmental, social and gover-
nance (ESG) investment and ESG ratings have grown rapidly
as big data and other technologies have enabled investors
to quantify hard-to-measure socio-political variables. Yet,
standards for what counts as ‘sustainable’ still vary. Earlier
accounting frameworks related to CSR – including the Glo-
bal Reporting Initiative and the Carbon Disclosure Project –
have been accused of providing an ‘alphabet soup’ of
poorly-correlated indicators (IMF, 2019). More recent indus-
try-led efforts like the Taskforce for Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD) are somewhat better. The TCFD has
departed from earlier CSR definitions of sustainability by
only including ‘financial material’ ESG issues. Led by Bank of
America chief executive and working closely with the Big
Four accounting firms, the World Economic Forum (WEF)
has initiated a framework to standardize ESG metrics and
link them to the UN’s SDGs (Naumann and Temple West,
2020).
Debates over applications of new technologies in sustain-
ability governance need to be situated within these exer-
cises in classification and standardization regarding what
qualifies as ‘sustainable’. The EU taxonomy, for instance, has
been linked to a green-supporting or brown-penalizing fac-
tor for capital requirements (Fleming and Brunsden, 2019).
More encompassing policies like ‘green quantitative easing’
suggested by central banks can only become feasible once
consensual definitions of green or brown investing are
established. Put differently, to realize the potential of tech-
nologies, we must first bring the context of private gover-
nance to the forefront of discussions about which
technologies can and should be used, as well as for which
purposes.
The manners in which technology-led experiments in glo-
bal sustainability governance foreground private over public
was also illustrated in many of the immediate responses to
the COVID-19 pandemic. The World Health Organization, for
instance, began coordinating a blockchain-based data
storage and communication platform to address the surge
in cyber attacks2 and mis-information during what it
described as the related ‘infodemic’.3 The platform, MiPasa,
is built on Hyperledger Fabric a permissioned (e.g. private)
blockchain originally built by IBM and whose governing
board consists of representatives of large technology (e.g.
Hitachi, Intel, Oracle, Microsoft), finance (American Express,
BBVA, JP Morgan Chase), professional services firms (Accen-
ture) and other MNCs (Daimler).4 Beyond blockchain pro-
jects, the wider trend towards reliance on private, individual
deployment novel technologies in global sustainability gov-
ernance was prominently encapsulated in the strategic part-
nership framework agreement signed between the UN and
WEF in 2019 for ‘accelerating the implementation of the
Sustainable Development Goals’ (WEF, 2019). The first key
focus area of this public-private partnership is harnessing
the ‘potential of financial innovation, new technologies and
digitalisation to increase financing for the SDGs’ (WEF,
2019).
In sum, technology-centred arrangements may tend to
perpetuate and even expand the roles of private actors in
sustainability governance, while potentially deepening the
pathologies of existing forms of private governance. As we
argue further in the next section, these tendencies are rein-
forced by a parallel trend of experimentalism in global gov-
ernance.
Experimentalist governance
Despite the considerable hype surrounding them, applica-
tions of emerging technologies in sustainability governance
remain very much provisional and experimental. It is thus
useful to consider such initiatives in relation to on-going
trends towards experimentalist forms of global governance.
Experimentalist governance involves the setting of goals,
trialling of multiple policy measures, continuous monitoring
of progress through quantitative indicators, and revision
based on rigorous peer review (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012).
Unlike centrally defined and potentially more static forms of
management, such looser and ‘provisional’ governance
forms can promote the flexible arrangements necessary to
respond to sustainability challenges in environments of
uncertainty (Best, 2014). While academic literature on experi-
mentalist governance originated in the study of devolved
responses for addressing common concerns in the European
Union (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012), wider forms of ‘global exper-
imentalism’ have recently been outlined (De Burca et al.,
2014; Nance and Cottrell, 2014). To date, these studies have
provided little consideration of the role of technologies in
private-led patterns of global governance (Armeni, 2015;
Campbell-Verduyn and Porter, 2014). This can overlap with
the forms of private governance discussed above – private
authorities can rely on experimentalist modes of governance
(see Brassett et al., 2012). The distinction is essentially that,
in referring to ‘private’ governance, the concern is with who
is doing the governing, while references to ‘experimentalist’
modes of governance are more about how governance is
done.
Global Policy (2020) © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Technology and Sustainability 3
Critically, engagements both by public and private actors
with blockchain, AI, and other emerging technologies are
notably experimentalist in character. One example here is in
the area of development aid. There are theoretical elabora-
tions on potential applications of blockchain to develop-
ment aid effectiveness, highlighting the potential of
transparent and immutable ledgers to enhance the credibil-
ity of policy commitments or address verification problems
(e.g. Reinsberg, 2019). Actual policy interventions using
these technologies, though, have generally taken precisely
the form of trialling multiple measures, measuring out-
comes, and constant revision. One notable example here is
the German Gesellschaft f€ur internationale Zusammenar-
beit’s (GiZ) ‘Blockchain Lab’, which sponsors and organizes
pilot projects by public and private actors using blockchain
to address challenges directly relating to the SDGs.
Bottom-up, less hierarchical forms of experimentalist gov-
ernance enabled by new technologies, could in theory
enrich sustainability governance by inviting participation
from local actors. Linders (2013, p. 430), for instance, writes
about potential open data platforms for developing coun-
tries to generate a ‘sort of TripAdvisor or Yelp for aid’ that
can encourage local accountability of technology-enhanced
programs. In practice, experimentalism’s tendency to also
offer highly technical solutions may deepen barriers to par-
ticipation. Experimentalist decision-making often draws
heavily on calculative rationalities derived from financial
accounting in order to accurately compare the results of the
diverse approaches employed to achieve common goals. In
their focus on measuring and auditing performance, these
rationalities often recast governance as merely a technical
and administrative matter. This diminishes the role and
input of local knowledge (Shore and Wright, 2015; Strathern,
2000).
Likewise, the growing technology-intensiveness of experi-
mentalist governance narrows the range of non-state actors
able to participate in public-private partnerships. It is primar-
ily private companies and the largest INGOs that have the
resources to create and manipulate the technologies at the
heart of novel solutions to global sustainability challenges
(Duberry, 2019). Consequently, smaller and more local
actors, in particular from the Global South, may be left out,
entrenching existing disparities in access and participation.
Moreover, these disparities may well be amplified as large
technology firms seek to maximize both data collection and
possession. Private companies’ access to a growing amount
and diversity of data can thus shape agendas in ways that
favour particularistic over collective concerns (Arora, 2016).
For example, governments face domestic political pressures
and economic challenges that open up space for interna-
tionally-coordinated, experimentalist governance of the digi-
tal economy. The UN’s Global Pulse programme connects
academics, private and government actors and UN person-
nel to generate ‘actionable’ insights about how Big Data can
facilitate sustainable development. But Global Pulse projects
in practice are dominated by private businesses and govern-
ments, with relatively limited possibilities for the involve-
ment of CSOs. Likewise, geopolitical competition among
data powers, such as China, the US and the EU, can encour-
age domestic experimentalist governance innovations, as
these states seek to enhance and secure their own digital
capabilities (Mahrenbach and Mayer, 2019). One prominent
example is China’s Great Firewall, which simultaneously
cleared the path for ground-breaking research and industrial
development of AI and made it more difficult for non-Chi-
nese businesses to operate in China (Aaronson and Leblond,
2018). Diverse government incentives thus encourage exper-
imentalist governance in the digital economy as a means of
achieving preferred outcomes, while reinforcing patterns of
political power and participation that may tend towards par-
ticularistic rather than collective gains. The crucial roles of
large technology firms in sustainability experiments could
enable them to define the agendas and goals pursued. The
competing pressures faced by governments seeking to both
expand their own gains from the digital economy and to
use modern technologies further complicate the benefits of
experimentalism.
Governing informal and illicit economies
Finally, efforts to apply new technologies to sustainability
challenges have very frequently been driven by efforts to
grapple with the growing prevalence of informal economies.
Here, our concern is with who and what are being gov-
erned. Economic informality in this sense has been an
important, cross-cutting concern in sustainable development
policy in recent decades (see Bernards, 2018; Phillips, 2011;
Rodima-Taylor, 2014; Taylor, 2010).5 Informality refers to the
activities and actors that operate outside the regulations
and laws of the modern economy (Loayza, 2016). Informal
actors who usually represent marginal populations and
groups are not able to fully benefit from public services or
formal sector protection and risk mitigation, while also not
able to contribute to the creation of public goods through
taxation and other mechanisms. At the same time, informal
sector enterprises may benefit from greater flexibility and
dynamism of their activities as well as serve as a source of
employment for marginal populations during economic
down-turns (Loayza, 2018). The dynamics of local informality
are intricate, yet better attempts need to be made to under-
stand the contexts in which many technology-led sustain-
ability governance initiatives are ultimately grounded.
Localized informal practices are wrapped up in global value
chains, for instance, through casualized labour in agriculture
or outsourcing in clothing production. These present partic-
ular governance challenges around labour rights and envi-
ronmental standards (Meagher, 2016).
Technological applications in sustainability governance
are often aimed at making informal or illicit economies ‘legi-
ble’ both to regulators and to global capital. Muirhead and
Porter (2019) argue that the ‘traceability systems’ enabled
by new digital technologies for tracking the cross-border
travel of an increasingly diverse range of objects – including
conflict minerals, pharmaceuticals, carbon emissions, and
money laundering – form complex, heterogenous constella-
tions between the physical properties of the objects being
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traced and the networks and infrastructures used for their
management. By enabling clearer visibility and authentica-
tion of objects – including intangible ones – traceability sys-
tems can, in some instances, help reduce areas of informal
or illicit activity. New technologies may render human traf-
ficking more visible and governable (e.g. by tracking illegal
financial transactions), broaden awareness of victims’ plight
and facilitate networking between law enforcement and
non-state organizations combatting human trafficking. An
example here is the Global Emancipation Network which
brings together technology partners such as Microsoft,
splunk, Deep Vision AI and others with law enforcement,
anti-trafficking non-profits, and businesses in hospitality,
finance and transportation to deploy advanced data analyt-
ics to make human trafficking more visible as a means of
helping to stop it.6
Once again, there are important tradeoffs. Rendering local
actors ‘legible’ through technological means in the context
of global supply chains dominated by distant lead firms or
development projects by metropolitan donors can result in
the imposition of external, pre-determined criteria on local
spaces and practices. This interplay of informal activities
with efforts to promote sustainability through formalization,
transparency, and traceability, in turn, has significant, if
ambiguous, implications for livelihoods. Efforts to govern
artisanal mining are a notable example (Vogel et al., 2018),
as are conservation measures (Witter and Satterfield, 2019),
both of which are prone to excluding local populations.
Technological applications can exacerbate these dynamics,
particularly where they double down on the weaknesses of
market-led forms of supply chain governance discussed
above.
For example, there has been a recent flurry of blockchain
applications for preventing child labour in cobalt mining in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as demand for
cobalt (a key component of batteries for electric cars and
portable electronics) has surged in recent years (e.g. Lewis,
2019). Most of these programmes aim to prevent child
labour by reliably certifying that cobalt has been mined
from specific industrial installations rather than from arti-
sanal mines, where most child labour takes place. Even if it
were to eliminate child labour from global supply chains,
displacing artisanal mining with industrial mining would
likely have ambiguous livelihood consequences for mining
communities at best. Recent research has highlighted, for
instance, growing evidence of labour market segmentation,
including a preference for expat workers in industrial min-
ing, as well as limited wage gains for workers moving from
artisanal to industrial mining in the Copperbelt, driving a
rise in inequality in the region (Radley, 2020; Rubbers, 2019).
There are serious questions here that need to be raised
about the kinds of risks, and for whom, new technologies
might be used to mitigate.
In sum, technological solutions to sustainability issues
often boil down to attempts to render complex and geo-
graphically dispersed informal spheres of activity ‘legible’
and traceable. Such transparency efforts have important, yet
often underexplored, implications. On the input-side, early
processes of technological development and application can
be hampered by significant disparities in access to material
resources and representation that underpin digital and
socio-economic divides. On the output side, transparency
provided in evolving technological experiments is geared to
the investment decision matrices of financiers, to the regula-
tory compliance mandates of governments, and to end con-
sumers.
Suggestions for Research and Policy
Policy making and broader public discussion over the
integration of emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence, Big Data, and blockchain into global sustain-
ability governance need to be far more socially and politi-
cally sensitive than is currently the case. Recognizing and
overcoming these issues is particularly important now as
these and other technologies are also being foregrounded
in transnational efforts to secure global supply chains and
other responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.7 Digital tech-
nologies being applied in complex and evolving environ-
ments both shape and are shaped by diverse human,
material, and normative elements (Bernards and Campbell-
Verduyn, 2019). Heterogenous assemblages combine local
inventive practices and cultural repertoires related to new
technology solutions with old and new infrastructural
pipelines and institutional actors (Rodima-Taylor and
Grimes, 2019). The integration of new technologies into
multi-stakeholder efforts to address sustainability chal-
lenges must be understood within the longer-standing
patterns of private authority, experimentalism, and strug-
gles to cope with informal economies in global gover-
nance.
By way of conclusion, we highlight a number of areas of
concern that must become central to discussion, analysis
and implementation of technology-led initiatives in global
sustainability governance. These questions are crucial if we
are to avoid extending well-known problems in attempting
to address global sustainability governance challenges.
Unfolding technological experiments do, of course, hold
some promise, and constitute quite a wide terrain. They
thus need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Yet, such
assessments can collectively consider important but often
backgrounded social, political, and economic relations
through which new technologies are being developed and
into which they are deployed:
Realistic evaluation of the potential of new technologies
First and foremost, attention must be given to what new
technologies cannot do. Technologies cannot solve prob-
lems that are social and political at the root – a point under-
lined in our discussion above. Many sustainability
governance problems concern politics and power. Three
guiding questions can encourage a systematic approach to
overcome contextual hindrances in employing technology
to actualize sustainability goals: Whose problems are new
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technologies solving? What new problems might these tech-
nologies create? And what other solutions might be fore-
gone in stressing techno-solutionism?
For instance, probabilistic means of detecting likely
human trafficking victims through AI applications might be
helpful in separating out forced and exploitative forms of
mobility from benign ones. However, identifying victims
alone is not enough to resolve the knot of issues shaping
and driving human trafficking. AIs cannot say what should
happen after victims of trafficking are located, or resolve the
underlying conditions which facilitate trafficking in the first
place. Without substantive attention to victims’ rights and
the overall institutional environment of reinforcing these
rights, detection of trafficked people might even render vic-
tims susceptible in new ways (e.g. to securitized and crimi-
nalized systems of border enforcement).
Attention to the new distribution of power triggered by
the adoption of emerging technologies
We have argued that experimentalist modes of technology-
driven sustainability governance can facilitate the introduc-
tion of novel intermediaries and brokers, while also entrench-
ing the roles of existing actors. Many of the latter actors are
private parties, such as audit and consulting companies;
many of the former are new tech firms. Moreover, fluid
areas of activity enabled via new connective technologies
bring together a variety of formal and informal actors.
As we have noted in the discussions of informality and
experimentalism above, these developments are creating
new political spaces, which can deepen old forms of exclu-
sion and uneven access to participation. For example, the
private firms involved in ESG have a potential to promote
industry-driven visions of future research and development
in environmental governance. These activities can also cre-
ate new global publics through awareness-raising and lob-
bying, and define what ‘count’ as global sustainable
practices. There is a need to recognize the costs of access-
ing these new quasi-public spaces, which can threaten to
reinforce existing inequalities and divides. The resources and
roles of large, well-funded international non-state organiza-
tions in developing AI applications in environmental conser-
vation, and the comparatively limited scope for participation
by affected communities, are notable examples here. The
new technologies increasingly used in sustainability gover-
nance are accompanied by security implications, particularly
regarding privacy, which are often not been adequately
addressed in extant debates. Security technologies are fun-
damentally ‘sites of experimentation’, enmeshed in both
ethical and practical dilemmas (Bosma, 2019, p. 194). The
inner workings of technologies have remained opaque
‘black boxes’ to many, if not most, stakeholders on grounds
of security or economic competitiveness.
To ensure then that local voices – particularly those of
affected communities – remain at the forefront of technol-
ogy-enhanced sustainability governance activities, we sug-
gest the following guiding questions. First, what kinds of
actors are new technologies actually (dis)empowering?
Second, what kinds of exclusions or inequalities might be
reinforced and/or created through technology-centred gov-
ernance processes?
Tensions between ‘audit culture’ and local participation
We have situated technology-led sustainability governance
initiatives in the concomitant rise of private, voluntary codes
and standards. We equally illustrated how experimentalist
modes of decision-making that may extend standardized
accounting practices and calculative rationales across diverse
forms of sustainability governance might do so at the cost
of local spaces and practices. The result of merging these
‘human accounting’ protocols and techniques of financial
accounting with those of socio-economic management can
be a prioritization of short-term profit maximization and
financial markets’ agendas over longer-term sustainability
needs. In recasting governance as a technical and adminis-
trative affair, sustainability accounting can minimize oppor-
tunities for and contributions from local actors and
knowledge, respectively. Soft-law governance approaches –
from emerging ESG standards to labour codes – exacerbate
these issues, being both difficult to challenge in case of dis-
putes and posing barriers to binding public regulation or
independent civil society monitoring.
These insights should focus attention on the need to
interrogate the kinds of transparency and accountability
sought in advancing common templates across diverse and
informal communities. In seeking to render ‘legible’ activities
in grassroots communities, private-driven sustainable gover-
nance initiatives may paradoxically by-pass the roles and
needs of key local mediators. Bottom-up forms of ‘everyday
experimentation’ and ‘frugal innovation’ at the grassroots
level can be crucial to addressing sustainability issues, yet
are often overlooked or marginalized in many current appli-
cations (Altamirano and Van Beers, 2018; Leliveld and Knor-
ringa, 2018). Ethical technology standards and frameworks
must be developed in collaboration with local communities
and stakeholders and by considering local norms and mor-
als. Several guiding questions can help systematize this pro-
cess of interrogation. First, what kinds of transparency and
accountability are promoted by applications of new tech-
nologies? And, second, who benefits from the forms of
accountability that are pursued in specific sustainability gov-
ernance efforts?
Asking ‘big’ questions on the need for participatory and
accountable frameworks
We have argued that private-led environmental and sustain-
ability initiatives have a potential to reinforce power imbal-
ances and exclusion when interacting with communities and
institutional actors in the Global South. This is because the
use and development of new technological solutions inter-
acts with formal and informal, local and geopolitical agen-
das and interests. The incomplete nature of frameworks and
standards governing new digital technologies can do little
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to ameliorate these issues. Here again, we need local-speci-
fic, participatory development of accountability standards
and frameworks in sustainability governance, in particular
standards that embody local norms and morals.
From this perspective, stressing the novelty of technologi-
cal solutions for complex and evolving sustainability chal-
lenges can distract from the larger structural issues in which
such governance is embedded. Helpful guiding questions
here include: What kinds of end-goals should sustainability
governance initiatives consider, and for whom? What kinds
of sustainability are emphasized in discourses – climate risk,
environmental risks, human/labour rights, or others? What
political and moral assumptions are bundled into technolog-
ical applications and their use? Who has access to ‘sustech’
applications and the capacity to use them? And are such
solutions creating new digital divides?
In the current environments of high complexity and
uncertainty surrounding sustainable governance initiatives,
we argue that ethical, social and political considerations
should be given foremost priority. This article has situated
the novelty of new technologies in three wider trends to
provide pathways for directing attention beyond mere tech-
nical considerations. There is undoubtedly room for these
and other technological initiatives to be grounded in further
trends. We expect that doing so will raise a host of other
questions pertaining to the evolving roles of technologies in
sustainability governance. We look forward to engaging with
them – and encourage public and private actors central to
sustainability governance to do the same.
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latter is undoubtedly important in governing a number of policy
areas relevant to sustainability and technology (Morin et al. 2019).
6. https://www.globalemancipation.ngo/global-emancipation-network-
mission-offerings/ [Accessed 11 May 2020].
7. By the ‘usual suspects’ noted above such as the Big Four professional
services firms (Deloitte 2020), the WEF (Liao 2020), but also scholars
(Mashamba-Thompson and Crayton 2020) who “recommend a low
cost blockchain and artificial intelligence-coupled self-testing and
tracking systems for COVID-19 and other emerging infectious dis-
eases” in sub-Saharan Africa.
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